Mexico’s President Vicente Fox chose a rather awkward time to take a stand supporting a multilateralist approach in foreign policy. Even though a multilateral approach matches neatly—almost naturally—with the country’s history, taking such a visible stand after the events of September 11 entailed huge risks that nobody in Fox’s cabinet could ignore, even if, in retrospect, few truly understood what the actual risks were. Yet, oblivious to that fact, the government pushed ahead. Even after President George W. Bush had decided not to pursue a vote in the UN Security Council on a follow-up resolution that would have de facto authorized the use of force in Iraq, the Mexican government found it necessary to state that it would have voted “no.” The critical question is less whether this constitutes an approach to foreign policy that is new for Mexico than whether the administration truly understands the implications of its newfound ways.
The issue is not that the government ignored the unfolding drama; it is, rather, that it chose to take a
proactive line that ran directly counter to the avowed policy of the United States, Mexico’s largest trading partner and its natural geographical ally. Was it a principled, courageous stand or a dangerous, risky adventure? Oddly enough, all the evidence seems to indicate that President Fox chose a rather utopian course based more on absolute Christian values on the sanctity of life than on a new interpretation of the principles of Mexico’s traditional foreign policy, which are based on nonintervention and on a strict definition of what constitutes official recognition of a nation’s government.
At the end of the day, Mexico was able to take part in the UN Security Council’s deliberations and still avoid defining itself to the rest of the world. However, the decisionmaking process that took place behind the scenes as well as in public revealed the nature of the Fox administration, its preferences, and perceived limits, as well as its opportunities. Hence, this analysis aims to explore the criteria that guided the government’s assessment, discuss the environment in which the decision was made, and then draw some conclusions about what all this means for Mexico and for its relationship with the United States.
Principles and Foreign Policy
By framing the issue of the proposed second resolution in the Security Council in terms of absolute ethical principles, President Fox trapped himself into a debate that, once unleashed, nobody could control or stop. The important question was whether this was done on purpose or whether it was simply the result of inexperience. The fact is that the president was not ignorant of the stakes. In fact, despite strong—and at times almost relentless, but also largely rhetorical—pressures from the Bush administration, at the UN Security Council, the Fox government stuck to its guns on the question of Iraq. Furthermore, once the idea of a second resolution was abandoned, various members of the Fox team even boasted about the way they would have voted. The obvious conclusion is that the president’s decision was based on criteria other than Mexico’s relationship with the United States.
Although pressures from the United States played an important part in Fox’s process of decisionmaking, many of those pressures proved counterproductive. Whenever U.S. government officials exert pressure on Mexican leaders in public, they end up getting exactly the opposite of what they were aiming for. Whether rightly or wrongly, Mexican officials have long resisted U.S. pressure in public. Much more important, Mexicans hold a deep, often irrational, resentment against the United States. Despite many hypotheses about the origins of that resentment and of the means used to nurture it over time, public statements by U.S. officials are not—in fact, cannot—be taken lightly in the domestic political arena. Hence, by taking a strong stand in public, both President Bush and several of his lieutenants, ended up producing the opposite of what they had expected. In retrospect, it is debatable whether President Fox would have been willing to negotiate a vote or to reconsider his own premises for the vote; but it is certain that his domestic options diminished significantly after statements from major U.S. public figures came out in the press.
No less important is the fact that most Mexicans don’t seem to comprehend the effect of the terrorist attacks of September 11 on the psyche of the U.S. population in general and U.S. foreign policy in particular. Mexicans, like many others around the world, fail to recognize that the attacks aroused fears among many U.S. citizens that they could be attacked at any minute. Thus, because many people around the world see the United States as an almost unfathomable and frightening power that has to be restrained, the global community finds it difficult to appreciate the changes that have taken place within the society and the body politic of the United States as a result of those attacks. These changes include the emergence of a new vision for the country’s foreign policy, an approach that broke with the traditions of the previous decades. The Fox administration was largely oblivious to these changes and circumstances.
While ignoring the changing environment inside the United States, the Fox administration was launching a revolution of its own in Mexico’s foreign policy. A closer examination of the foreign policy of the first presidential administration that is not headed by a member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) shows that there is no question that the criteria shaping the agenda have changed quite drastically. For almost a century, Mexico’s foreign policy had been shaped largely in response to a long series of foreign interventions and territorial losses. That history fostered a sense of profound suspicion of powerful forces and led to the desire to remain at the margin of the world powers’ interaction in international forums. Thus, the foundation for the country’s policy of nonintervention and nonrecognition of governments stemmed from Mexico’s own historical reality and, consequently, responded quite directly to its implicit definition of national interest. And most Mexicans were happy to leave things as they were.
There is no question that many PRI administrations turned the noninterventionist tradition into an instrument of power. They purposefully nurtured anti-U.S. sentiments found in primary school textbooks, and they often took grand stands against the United States on important, albeit usually inconsequential, issues. Sometimes, as with Mexico’s vote on Cuba at the Organization of American States in the 1960s, the issue was symbolic, but the vote paid large dividends over the years: by supporting the Cuban revolution on a rhetorical level, the Mexican government not only succeeded in hindering the growth of the guerrilla movement in Mexican territory but also was able to deflect criticism from the Left on innumerable other issues—from economic reform to the North American Free Trade Agreement. Despite its apparent dogmatism, Mexico’s traditional foreign policy had been extremely pragmatic.
President Fox decided to take hold of the so-called “democratic bonus” that his election (and the PRI’s defeat) had brought about by undertaking a major shift in the country’s foreign policy. Mexico sought a seat on the UN Security Council partly in order to give visibility to the face of the new democratic Mexico and also to advance an agenda that involved developing a supranational regime to deal with a new international order (in migration, environment, indigenous and human rights, trade, democracy, and so on) as well as containing the unilateralist tendencies of the United States. In President Fox’s view, Mexico’s new democratic administration could and should stand on its own feet. In all these considerations, the government’s views were inherently closer to the French tradition and current position than to that of any other governments.
It follows, then, that President Fox had come to the conclusion that Mexico’s relationship with the United States was mature enough to withstand a “no” vote at the UN Security Council, no matter what pressure the United States exerted. Although this assessment underscored his activism in matters of foreign policy, in the case of the proposed second resolution, there was a strong religious component as well: the president was opposing military action not only on the basis of the nation’s long-standing noninterventionist platform but also on the president’s personal belief that peace, like life, is sacred. There is little question that the president took an important gamble in taking this step. While following his own personal beliefs and catering to the crowds, the president clearly undertook the risk of alienating the U.S. government. From this vantage point, the real question becomes: Beyond the potentially ephemeral rise in his popularity, can President Fox build on his standing in the domestic arena?
In addition to the broad political issues that have guided Mexico’s strategy and tactics at the UN Security Council, there is a political, even personal, dynamic to the president’s decisionmaking process on this issue. After being beaten up for months in the media and in every single forum by politicians, academics, political parties, and most pundits, President Fox found that standing up to the United States on the question of Iraq garnered him not only popularity and political respect but also political cover (as well as, undoubtedly, international legitimacy). Given the fact that it suddenly became easy to clobber the U.S. government, voting “no” at the Security Council was politically and personally advantageous for the president and must have provided a great relief for him. The question is whether Mexico will have to bear any consequences—domestic as well as bilateral—as a result of that vote.
Mexico and the Second “Non-Vote” at the UN Security Council
President Fox framed the Mexican debate on Iraq in terms of peace and war and the sacredness of life. He presented these views and became an advocate for peace. Thus, he not only turned the debate into a domestic political issue but also drastically reduced his government’s options. There’s little question that inexperience played a role in the way the administration approached the process of deciding its vote. The best evidence of this fact was the unprofessional way in which the Foreign Ministry announced the way it would vote on the first round (for Resolution 1441), only to back off two weeks later, when the French decided to vote for Resolution 1441. That mistake was not repeated in the process that took place for the second resolution. Yet, immediately after Resolution 1441 was passed, President Fox launched an endless campaign in opposition to the war. He took every opportunity to make this statement and to rally the people against military action. In so doing, he left himself no room to maneuver.
Even though the foreign minister changed in the period between the two UN resolutions, Mexico’s policy remained the same. Hence, the only possible conclusion is that the policy represents the president’s views. From this perspective, the government demonstrated several traits in the way it defines its priorities, develops policy, and reaches its decisions. Among these, the most notable are the following:
• The president’s religious beliefs are paramount in his mind-set. This is a particularly revealing fact, because even though the president kept talking about “principles,” he was not referring to the country’s traditional foreign policy principles.
• Regardless of who was in charge at the Foreign Ministry, the president has maintained a strong will to be active in the multilateral arena, to pursue the French argument for containing U.S. power, and to display an ambitious foreign policy in regions and issues that have previously not been part of Mexican foreign policy, such as entering into talks with the Arab League (and, earlier, offering to mediate between the two Koreas).
• Opinion polls have proven to be crucial in the president’s decisionmaking process. Polls can be so important that they can determine the outcome of a decision. In fact, the president seems to see opinion surveys as ends in and of themselves, rather than as mere instruments for making decisions.
Above all, it is remarkable to notice that the president assigned relatively little weight to the United States when making his decision on Mexico’s vote. He clearly assumed that the relationship was strong enough and mature enough to withstand separation of the daily issues that nurture the relationship—from trade to migration, investment, and the border—from political, ethical, and diplomatic considerations. In this, he not only departed from the foreign policy that has characterized the country over the past 20 years of increasing interaction across the common border but also exhibited an aloofness vis-à-vis the United States that has long been untypical of Mexican governments. Only time will tell whether the underlying (and probably implicit) assumptions of this way of approaching the relationship were correct and warranted.
Once the president decided to take a strong, principled stance on the issue of Iraq, his administration’s position at the UN was all but foreordained. His own actions bolstered the Mexican population’s position as expressed in the opinion polls, but they also coincided rather neatly with Mexicans’ own instinctive rejection of the use of force, a position that is based on the country’s history of loss of its territory.
When President Bush decided not to pursue a second resolution, many a president and prime minister around the world breathed more easily. Few governments wanted to legitimize the use of force, but even fewer wanted to alienate the United States. The need to take a position through a vote by all the members of the UN Security Council raised the domestic political stakes in many capitals around the globe; endless negotiations evidenced the difficulties that each member nation faced, and few had much leeway to vote their individual preferences. Once the vote was called off, each government moved to the next item on its agenda. Not so the Mexican government. In its endless search for higher popularity ratings, the Fox administration went out on a limb to express its preferences and the fact that it would have opposed the second resolution. The question is: Why?
It was easy to predict that a “no” vote would deliver large support, both from the Mexican population at large as well as from the political parties and politicians in general. In a country where anti-U.S. sentiments run right beneath the skin and where people have an instinctive rejection of military action, opposing a military operation was tantamount to following the crowd. For weeks, polls showed that Mexicans overwhelmingly supported rejection of a second UN resolution, and no serious debate on the implications of voting one way or the other ever took place. The media blasted away daily, while the president shifted his position, apparently without realizing that his statements carried weight as well as consequences. Once the president announced his position, his popularity and political standing improved dramatically. Unfortunately, he never turned this support into action in the legislature or on any other front. His public announcement was merely a statement of an ethical stance.
War versus the United States
Mexico does not have the vision or the ambition of a world power. If anything, the country’s history is one of a nation that often fell victim to the excesses of foreign powers, be they European or American. It is this history that turned Mexico into a strong and active participant in international multilateral organizations and also an unwilling player in those forums that might put the country’s core interests at stake. Though twice a member of the UN Security Council in the past, Mexican governments usually shied away from positions that could jeopardize relations with the United States. It was one thing to sustain controversial or anti-U.S. positions in major forums where there were no consequences, and quite another to face the United States head on, and even more so after September 11.
It is not surprising that a major part of the government’s foreign policy establishment opposed Mexico’s membership in the UN Security Council this time around. Some of its most distinguished elder statesmen warned of potentially grave consequences. None of these viewpoints deterred Fox, who was set on showing off Mexico’s new democracy.
Faced with the need to define himself on the proposed second UN resolution, the president had two choices. He could frame the issue in terms of peace and war, life and death; or he could frame it in terms of Mexico’s relationship with the United States. Pursuing the first course, the president found himself allied with France and other European nations, but also opposed to the United States and traditionally close allies, such as Spain. Even though framing the issue in terms of Mexico’s relationship with its northern neighbor would have been highly unpopular, this approach might have enabled President Fox to present his dilemma in practical terms, as opposed to philosophical ones. By choosing to ignore the alternative, the president set the country on a popular, albeit risky, course.
The question is what comes next. Having found a new source of easy popularity, it appears quite clear that the government’s position will harden vis-à-vis the United States. The single issue that dominated the thrust of the Fox administration’s foreign policy at the outset—an agreement on migration—has all but disappeared from the bilateral agenda. Therefore, from the vantage point of the Fox administration, there’s little to be gained from close ties to the United States, while a tougher rhetorical stance seems to have the ability to pay off handsomely.
The actual results of the war in Iraq will become a fundamental factor in the way the Fox administration defines its position vis-à-vis the United States for the remainder of Fox’s term. To the extent that a swift victory on the ground vindicates the U.S. position, Mexico, like the rest of the world, will retreat and return to business as usual. Most likely, however, all those who aimed at containing the power of the United States secretly covet a scenario in which the United States is taught a lesson in humility: after all, it is always easier to play the role of the underdog.
In a few days, Mexico will preside over the UN Security Council. Depending on how the war in Iraq evolves, Mexico’s government may find itself between the United States and a hard place. It is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which some European nations may want to force a cease-fire on the United States, or issues involving civilian casualties are brought before the Security Council. Mexico’s position will become even touchier in those circumstances and even more noticeable than it was before. Even though the Mexican government is likely to keep rallying the peace camp, the potential for serious conflict will increase, with little to be gained from the effort.
In the end, beyond the rhetoric and the show, both Mexico and President Fox face real dilemmas that no war in the Middle East can settle. Mexico’s economy, though increasingly integrated with that of the United States, is paralyzed and requires fundamental reforms to modernize it, attract investment, and help it recover. President Fox’s position vis-à-vis the United States may turn out to be less costly than it may appear today, but it certainly does not help the country’s economic recovery. What is much more important, however, is that the president’s strengthened popularity has not translated into a political accord that may help him get those reforms passed through the legislature. Eventually, Mexicans may end up wondering whether, beyond the ephemeral increase in the president’s popularity, the risks that he assumed in this adventure were worth the price Mexico may have to pay.
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