Cárdenas and López Obrador: defending what?

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political-analisis

The left-wing’s rejection of the 27th and 28th Constitutional articles proposed by the Executive Power was to be expected. What is interesting is how two of the left’s main protagonists, Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who started defending the oil from different trenches, have decided to join (though not mix) efforts. This reunion will comprise, on one hand, Cárdenas’ institutional legitimacy and historical leadership on the matter and, on the other hand, López Obrador’s popular mobilization capacity. Nevertheless, the chances of truly stopping the reform are scarce, which lead the following question: beyond defending oil, what are the motivations and potential benefits of a Cárdenas-López Obrador alliance?
Cárdenas and López Obrador’s joint strategy materialized within the proposal of holding a referendum for the aforementioned reforms. Both politicians argue that the energy reform’s validity should be in the hands of citizens and they should be the ones who decide whether opening up PEMEX to private investment is desirable or not. In addition, they demand that this referendum should occur before the approval of Peña Nieto’s reform. This is as unlikely as to stop a PRI-PAN potential alliance in Congress with the aim of approving reform, given that a referendum, which is included in the 35th Constitutional article, still doesn’t have the secondary legislation needed to be held and, as it that wasn’t enough, the Constitution establishes that the referendum should occur at the same time as a federal election, which means that it couldn’t happen before 2015.
Regardless of the chosen strategy, Cárdenas’ motives to be involved alongside López Obrador seem to deal with unifying the left on defending oil nationalism. This issue has been one of the political current’s main pivots, so fighting separately would only have strengthened the perception over the egoism of its leaderships shown by the lack of agreements, even in matters considered to be common causes for this political sector. In this sense, the benefits that Cárdenas could obtain from this Pact seem to be more linked to protecting his legacy inside the left that ensuring his political existence within PRD.
Unlike Cárdenas, the benefits for López Obrador with this alliance are more pragmatic and have a long-term vision. The main profit for the National Regeneration Movement’s leader by joining forces with Cárdenas is to rebuild institutional legitimacy for his cause. In addition, this alliance tones down his rhetoric and gets him closer to a sector of the population who might agree with his motives but not necessarily with his means. López Obrador has shown his decision to favor the institutional path by supporting the referendum and, in an unprecedented case, to acknowledge Peña’s administration as a contact partner in a dialogue (unlikely, let it be said) to debate the government’s reform projects. The “renewed” institutionalism of López Obrador heads his political party in a path to obtain its registry in 2014 – without disregarding the importance of the streets as the main basis for his project.
In the end, beyond the individual benefits both Cárdenas and López Obrador might gain, the left wing is obtaining a sort of political responsibility and union from which it usually lacks, except on some electoral junctures – given its divisions. To form a common front against the energy reform allows the left-wing to be an actor capable of leaving its internal divisions aside in order to defend its ideals. However, it is not clear if this alliance will be common, especially when a true struggle over power is at stake. It seems clear that this alliance is more an internal political maneuver within the left rather than the country’s energetic future.

CIDAC

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