The presentation of a reform initiative of political-electoral nature that may serve as an alternative to the one set in the Pact for Mexico – signed by the Senate coordinators of both PAN and PRD – and the belligerence of several PAN Senators against their leadership, were the excuse used to dismiss Ernesto Cordero as the party’s coordinator in the Senate. However, the decision of Gustavo Madero – using his powers as PAN leader – goes beyond a confrontation caused by the Pact for Mexico or an evaluation of Cordero’s performance. It needs to be seen in the context of an internal struggle in order to gain control of PAN.
The choice of the party’s leadership will take place in December this year and has already driven different power groups within PAN to be established as their militants’ first option. Madero’s group has explained the signature of the Pact for Mexico as a way to cooperate with the federal government, while the party’s agenda is set. Nevertheless, the perception among his adversaries is that the strategy implies a collaborative effort with PRI, which has echoed in many of PAN members who consider that only the agenda of PRI has been given priority in the agreement.
Cordero’s dismissal was just a matter of time, not because it may affect the relation between Madero and the current federal administration but because it proved a way to weaken their biggest opponents within the party, the group identified as “Calderonistas” (akin to former President Calderón) by taking away attention and budget – the parliamentary coordination has an annual budget of approximately 210 million pesos –so as to renew PAN’s national leadership. On the other hand, “calderonistas” might have rushed Cordero’s dismissal with the purpose of exposing a victim of Madero’s alleged authoritarianism. This message would be aimed to the party’s state structures, which have stressed their general disapproval to some decisions made by the National Executive Board (CEN). This would surely not be overlooked by the Senator in order to promote his personal and group agenda, under the pretense of going against of those who, in his view, intend to transform PAN into a submissive opposition.
That being said, if PAN performs poorly in elections where it’s assumed to be competitive, particularly Baja California’s gubernatorial race, Madero’s days as PAN leader would come to an end. However, even if the party manages to win that state and even triumph at some emblematic municipalities in Veracruz, Chihuahua and Puebla, it wouldn’t secure Madero’s reelection next December. Strangely enough, July 7th elections might not be an effective way to foresee what will happen at the end of this year since the party’s conflict are not only about CEN struggles but the particular situation in each of PAN’s state directive committees. In short, political actors involved are strategically playing its cards under the assumption that there will be a renewal in the party’s leadership, but the idea that Madero has pawned PAN (and its history of opposing PRI) to Peña Nieto’s government, might have cost him reelection.
Be that as it may, the Pact has succeeded in moving forward a legislative agenda that had been paralyzed for almost two decades. The majority of intellectuals think that reforms have numerous benefits. The general thinking of both PAN and PRD regarding the Pact is that general population will praise their contribution and participation in the process. In any given case, it’s a bet whose expiration date (on December), might end up becoming too close for any tangible satisfaction to be seen.
By the way, where are the reforms in the second half of the year? Whether they were product of a collaborative effort or not, truth is that during the first six months of 2013, reforms were enacted without too many problems. Going through a political path in which the shifting sands of PAN’s internal struggles lie ahead will certainly be a challenge for the negotiation abilities of the current government.
CIDAC
Comments