It is no longer a secret that Michoacán is the biggest flashpoint regarding security issues in Mexico. This state became the stage of a complex and explosive blend of factors that have led to lawlessness, among these factors are criminal organizations, self-defense groups, social protests and, in addition, an interim governor. After months of delay, the federal government has announced the mobilization of State forces to the state. Faced with such information, it’s inevitable to remember the first security act in Calderón’s government: the deployment of Federal Army throughout Michoacán. Given the similarities, are we at the verge of a discouraging déjà vu or are there elements to think about a different outcome?
This week, the Interior Secretary announced – in a brief manner – the basis of the operation. Keeping with the “coordination” policy that the Federation has so greatly uttered, Osorio Chong explained that the operation shall be conducted by a single chain of command led by the Defense Secretariat and which will look forward to the participation of municipal authorities. This is an important difference with Calderón’s strategy, which was known for its complete distrust of local governments (sometimes with a strong justification). The downside is that it could never formally support those suspicions; it suffices to recall the Michoacanazo ridicule. For now, the army deployed has headed towards communities protected by self-defense forces with the purpose of pacifying the region and substituting them. This will not be a simple task, ever since these groups refuse to disarm by arguing that they would be left unprotected when criminal organizations attack. The government’s dilemma consists on forcing them to turn in their weapons or “tolerating” them with the risk of it becoming a larger problem. It is worth to recall that self-defense forces have been linked with criminal organizations in the past.
On the other hand, a group of PAN Congressmen has raised the possibility of exercising the faculty that allows Senate to disappear local governmental powers. However, which ones are they referring? The current powers are “de facto” gone. Even though six years ago, criminality was a serious issue in Michoacán, nowadays insecurity has risen to scandalous levels. Military intervention – which was supposed to solve the problem – resulted in the fragmentation and spread of cartels and the subsequent creation of self-defense groups. Six years ago, military display generated positive expectations, but now it’s a different story. Even though Osorio Chong warned that the army will not leave Michoacán until peace is obtained, the truth is that soldiers will not be able to ensure continuous and permanent security throughout the state. Let us remember that, in the first instance, it was argued that the presence of army forces would help strengthening the institutions of local security. Nowadays, that argument is still in force, even when the evidence of its efficiency is not apparent. The pacifying that the army might be able to enforce will not be sustainable if local institutions are not purged and strengthened.
It’s ironic that, six years after Calderón chose Michoacán as the first objective in his fight against crime, the entity now serves as a laboratory with the purpose of testing the current government’s security strategy. Peña’s administration has the challenge of turning the emphasis of military actions into the state’s institutionalization, an extremely questionable longing. While order in the entity is not imposed, understood as the effective rule of law with no extensions or prerogatives, Michoacán will face complete social decomposition and will also become a potential contagious agent for bordering states.
Federal intervention in Michoacán has a relevant connotation; behind the difference in conception (since there is not a clear separation of strategies) between the former and the current government, a key factor lies ahead: whether it is a distortion or an altogether new reality. Calderón’s critics always argued that, beyond his strategy, the problem was breaking the implicit truce, the balance that de facto coexisted with criminal organizations. Calderón thought that it was a new reality and it needed a different focus. When it came to power, the current government implicitly accepted that Calderón “stirred up the hornet’s nest” and that this was the cause of violence. By deploying the army in Michoacán, the new administration is somehow complying with Calderón’s point of view. The question is whether it will be wiser and more careful choice when developing a strategy able to pacify the state and, hence, the whole country.
CIDAC
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