The political-electoral reform: when more complex does not equal improvement

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political-analisis

During the past weeks there has been a lot of discussion about the consequences of the secondary legislation of the telecommunications and energy reforms. Public debates have warned about the alleged protection that the federal government puts over the interest of the major TV networks or the dominance of Telmex within the country’s telephonic sector; they have also raised their concerns about a “lack of information” shown by the current government regarding the energetic liberalization’s alleged benefits. However, there has been little attention to a legislation that, in a way, could be the cornerstone of all of the other Constitutional modifications: the political-electoral reform.
The legislative framework that deals with the access to public power (and public resources) is not a minor issue. The political-electoral reform, published in the Mexican Official Journal on February 10th, issued changes to thirty Constitutional articles and established new laws regarding political parties, elections as well as electoral crimes. On the second transitory article of the aforementioned reform, Congress had put itself with the task of applying such secondary legislation before April 30th. With all the reforming frenzy that the 62nd Legislature has proved to be and for the nth time, Congressmen did not meet the agreed deadlines and have recently announced that they will summon an extraordinary session period – to be held on May 14th – , with the purpose of overcoming this pending issue. According to the 105th Constitutional article, if the secondary legislation were not materialized by July, that is to say, ninety days before the formal start of the 2015 mid-term elections, the current legal framework would have to come into use. An “emergency change” made on the 210th article of the Federal Code for Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE) could modify (in something that could be labeled as a reckless legislative act) the starting date of the process and, thus, enable the new laws to enter into force. All of this is without mentioning the delay – that has been pending since the previous reform of 2012 – of the rules for independent candidacies, an alternative for the current dominance of political parties within citizens’ participation.
The mutual complaints expressed by all factions regarding alleged cases of law violations or lack of clarity in the rules puts each of the parties’ leaders back to the negotiating table. The problem is that experience tells us that overcomplicating the electoral laws does not translate into improving them. Quite the contrary, the shortcoming of the recurring electoral reforms is a proof of the deep and rising distrust between stakeholders (which, by the way, are both judge and jury). Although electoral reforms have were key into establishing the basis for democratic transition – particularly in 1996 and the so-called “opening up” of the demised IFE – they now appear to be whims that, even if they came to fruition, would end up leaving everyone unsatisfied. Since the controversial 2006 election, every political cycle has sought the “easy way out” of blaming the electoral referee, going to the extreme of changing its name, cramming it with powers and, quite possibly, leaving it to deal with confusing guidelines. In the game of electoral dominoes, parties are never satisfied with the result and remain on futile fights that do not change the political course of the country. Using the dominoes analogy once again, they go from “traditional” to “Cuban” dominoes; that is to say, more dominoes, more uncertainty and more potential conflicts. At the end of the day, what can be concluded is that the target is no longer to enhance competition; in other words, developing democracy is not a priority.
What is evident is that the lack – impossibility – of an agreement on basic issues for political and party interactions and, above all, the huge distrust raised by the need for so many regulation and controls, something that will never leave the parties satisfied. What they seek is not a law that will regulate the political-electoral processes but a straitjacket that will force a result over which there is not, and there cannot be, any consensus because, in the end, elections are a zero-sum game. For years it seemed that the successive reforms in these matters would go towards the creation of an environment that would accept an equal competition: the case of 1996 stands out as a clear progress on the matter. Nowadays, it is clearer that the only thing that will satisfy parties is victory and only one can achieve it. There will surely be more reforms but it is also evident that there is no ideal context for parties – and society as a whole – to achieve a competition environment that may satisfy everyone involved. The target has ceased to be competition: now the de facto purpose is to issue reforms perpetually.

CIDAC

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