On October 14, the Chamber of Deputies – clearly reacting to a scandal derived from a news story regarding the activities of a famous legal firm within the legislative discussions concerning the tax reform – approved a draft that aims to regulate the dealings of lobbyist in Congress. Despite the negative connotations of the word, this mechanism constitutes a tool with judicial basis in the right of petition enshrined in the 8th Constitutional article. Nevertheless, opacity and the modus operandi of such an influential practice – that often acquires shades of political negotiation and from which a complete industry emerges – has created a negative perception. Within this context, what is the true story of lobbying in Mexico?
Even when former President Miguel de la Madrid (ruling the country from 1982 to 1988) lobbied with the aim of positioning Mexico as a developed country in the eyes of U.S., this practice didn’t appear in Congress until 1997, when, for the first time, no political party had an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies – that is to say, when legislative negotiations started with Congressmen and not within the federal executive institutions. In other words, the phenomenon has not changed for what has evolved is the nature of the speaker. Lobbying is a mean of communications between social organizations, private companies, individuals and/or their respective agents, with popular representatives elected in polls, or in other words, decision-makers. Likewise, state and municipal governments also exercise their lobbying powers with the aim of having more resources, especially during times of discussing the federal budget. On the other hand, the underlying possibility of establishing irregular negotiations with legislators has opened a debate regarding the necessity and importance of regulating such an activity.
Professional lobbying agencies or individuals receives enormous economic retributions when acting in favor of certain interests. However, there is no legislation nowadays that transparent the allocation of resources like there is in the U.S. Though the 61st Legislature had already approved an internal set of lobbying regulation that prevented from accepting payments and forced lobbyists to register in an electoral census within the Chamber of Deputies, some other mechanisms that had the purpose of tackling corruption and prevented some group interests to be a priority over those of the nation, were completely absent. The draft approved a few days ago proposes a new and insufficient regulation because, even if it implements some new restrictions for lobbyists, it doesn’t completely transparent their schemes. Nevertheless, there are still pending issues, such as preventing Deputies and their relatives (both political families as well as those with up to a fourth degree of consanguinity) the access to lobbying posts during their tenure and up to two years after their administration is over, with the purpose of avoiding conflicts of interest. In addition to this, it limits the maximum number of lobbyists to 20 per commission, and 2 per every legal entity that has been subscribed (from the 81 that are already within the census).
Lobbying is part of the Mexican political life. However, it should not be overlooked how these practices usually take place under informal schemes that mask bribery and corruption with the support of the Constitutional right to petition. One of the main critiques to lobbying is that its success greatly depends on how much money is invested in it. It is also considered a perverse and disruptive exercise that weakens the party cohesion (which is not necessarily a bad thing) and might diminish the influence of traditional political operators. In the end, when analyzing advantages and faults of lobbying and, if it is adequate, adjusting its regulation, one should consider how much these mechanisms manage to create legitimate and transparent approaches of society with legislators, determine responsibilities and, given the case for practices that are opposed to the country’s interest, provide credible penalties.
CIDAC
Comments