In past weeks, the 4th Legislative Report of Integralia Consulting was presented. Based on it, and as an example, we will state in 4 points some of the limits of indexes and analysis of legislative performance, that is to say, what could and could not be concluded from them.
1. Performance indexes: what do they really tell?
Most of the legislative analysis reports assume that more intervention, more initiatives presented, attendance as well as voting turnout are accurate indicators of a good performance. The limits of that supposition are evident when we consider, for example, that the impact of some legislation such as the reform decree to the Federal Labor Act is higher than the reform decree to the General Law on Education Infrastructure. Likewise, labor, education, public administration or government accounting reforms can be described as more important legislation than the rest of the 472 other initiatives. Since when the content of what’s voted is less important than the proportion of programmed issues or initiatives presented?
Likewise, villainizing Congress absenteeism a priori is not only reductionist but mistaken. It is worth recalling the criticism towards PAN Presidential candidate Josefina Vázquez Mota during the 2012 electoral campaign and her reported low attendance. While her participation is important, her work as PAN coordinator and as member of the Political Coordination Board went beyond voting in Congress (as a parenthesis, Mexico lacks from a deep analysis of the dynamics that occur within the Political Coordination Board in both Chambers). Legislative absenteeism could also mean a strategy to reduce the quorum and approve certain laws, which certainly cannot be qualified neither as legislative inefficiency nor negative acts. In fact, most of the times an absence and a legislative abstention mean a yes’ vote for the majority, since it reduces the minority’s probability of doubling the required votes for blocking or passing a specific initiative.
Historically, the number of voting absences has ranged from 97 to 146 from the 500 Deputies (19-29%) and from 35 to 42 from the 128 Senators (28-32%). One of the trends that have currently been observed is a decrease in the number of voting abstentions at both Chambers. This decline, which could be wrongly pointed out as an improvement in legislative performance, couldn’t be used to make conclusions on the quality of Mexican legislation.
Another aspect to be highlighted is the constant disapproval on the increase of the average delay of sessions in the Senate. Can we deduce that longer or timely sessions are equal to a better performance? Considering the increased party unity in both Chambers and that the average monthly length decreased when compared to other regular sessions, the delay could reflect only a negotiation occurring before the session. Since lobbying outside Congress can be equally, if not more, effective as the one done inside, this delay data do not necessarily imply misbehavior within both Chambers.
2. Legislative activism and party unity/cohesion
It is imperative to give party unity its exact dimension. In the absence of reelection, high levels of party unity are expected, since the legislator owes his position (and/or candidacy) to his party and not to the electorate. However, more unity does not imply a better internal negotiation within the party: only because the discussion is not public does not mean that it does not exist. Nevertheless, several legislative studies conclude the aforementioned.
For instance, at some state congresses, the party coordinator has whip instruments at his or her disposal, in the majority of cases in the form of monthly economic incentives. When a legislator votes against his party the incentives are restricted in order to ensure party unity at future voting processes. This way, groups can vote together in major issues, as was the case with the Pact for Mexico, while partisan struggles might be found on minor issues. Generally speaking, party cohesion in Mexico, at least for PRI, PRD and PAN, is higher than 90%. A 3 or 5 % deviation from this figure is not evidence of anything. In that regard, it can be said that if variations on cohesion are within that range, the perception that party unity was modified from the signature of the Pact for Mexico onwards is certainly false.
The problem with the index on total party cohesion at an ordinary session is that it neither allows the review of cohesion per subject nor to visualize the existence of factions within the party. In other words, by averaging the results, much of the existing variation on voting is eliminated and by pointing out cohesion that’s over 90%, it gives a reading of “faction nonexistence”. There are better indicators such as the “ideal point” distance between a legislator and a party leader elaborated either through statistical inference models, such as W-Nominate, developed by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, or the IRT (Item Response Theory) model with Bayesian inference developed by Jackman, Clinton and Rivers. Another important index of party unity, and which has higher implications, is the percentage of initiatives voted in coalition with another party.
3. On the increase in commissions and the breach of the rules
The fourth Integralia Legislative Report indicates the existence of a high number of commissions and a significant lack of efficiency on the dynamics within Congress. However, this analysis overlooks what’s behind a high number of commissions or inefficiency. On one hand, Mexico lacks studies that deal with the impact of internal regulation of Congress dynamics. Shifts of the aforementioned dynamics on exogenous changes, such as alteration of regulation on how commissions interact between each other or the existing controls on that particular process, have not been fully studied. Besides, there is not a real coercive mechanism that can punish the breach of rules.
4. Legislative inexperience
Finally, most of the legislative reports lack paragraphs on Mexican legislators’ specialization. This is partly due to the fact that there are no institutional frameworks that promote the aforementioned expertise. In fact, correcting legislation in Mexico without reelection is an almost impossible task. If the specialization does happen, it is sporadic. The academic background of legislators should play second fiddle, the legislative experience being more important. In fact, if a legislative experience does exist it is because the legislator has already taken popularly elected posts, whether at local Congresses or municipal assemblies or he has constantly been returning to different Chambers or he’s one of the first places in the party list of proportional representation. It’s been calculated that between 20 to 30% of legislators jump back and forth Federal Chambers.
What can we conclude?
The aforementioned points do not cover a full analysis of all models of legislative performance in Mexico. They intend to highlight three aspects: firstly, that the country still lacks a deep understanding of dynamics within both Chambers; secondly, that indexes on legislative efficiency should be presented along with cases of measurements of legislative quality; and finally, that aggregated indicators, such as total party cohesion, overlook most of the variety, struggles, agreements and negotiations within Congress, these are the smooth details which haven’t been documented, measured or tracked but are key to the Mexican legislators’ behavior.
Rafael Ch y Lucía Motolinía
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