During the last couple of weeks, there have been clashes between community polices and alleged members of organized crime at several Michoacán locations. At the same time, there have been violent protests headed both by teachers and students, for example, the local Office of Education Secretary takeover, organized by the 18th section of the Union of Education Workers (SNTE) or the roadblocks and robbing of private automobiles done by teacher-training students. Although the media has focused on Guerrero and Oaxaca, Michoacán has not ceased to be a hot-button issue for governance and rule of law in Mexico.
According to CIDAC’s crime index of the last two years, Michoacán is one of the states where the number of serious crimes (kidnapping, extortion and murder) hasn’t decreased at all. Factors present in Michoacán such as political instability, abuse in the system of “uses and customs”, religious beliefs and the “epidemic” of community policing only tend to enhance the inherent hazards of organized crime. Regarding community police, whose most representative case is Cherán – where inhabitants try to fight the so-called “talamontes” – other municipalities have imitated narco defense tactics – even though drug traffickers argue that those polices do not spontaneously come up. Let us not forget another jewel in the crown of “uses and customs”: Nueva Jerusalén. In addition, the absence of Governor Vallejo is worth a mention. It took weeks for him to take leave of absence before being substituted by the acting Governor Jesús Reyna. In any case, Reyna does not face a promising panorama.
A common factor among the three states in which public attention has focused in the last couple of weeks is the absence of a local government that is able to preserve governability. The risk is that this phenomenon might repeat itself in other entities and may bring the harmful “failed State” argument back. This situation should be a source of concern for the government. Without wishing to be alarmist, it’s imperative to point out the possibility that the conflicts could get out of hand and no federal authority may come their way. It’s true that many of the aforementioned issues would be the responsibility of the Michoacán administration, but some others would require the immediate attention from federal authorities, which still don’t have a functional strategy.
In 2006, a few days after taking office, former President Calderón started the Conjunto Michoacán Operation, which sent over 5 thousand troops to fight organized crime in the state. The results of that strategy were pyrrhic. As Peña Nieto assumed power, a series of changes such as a Federal Police retreat and a larger participation of the Army can be observed, but that does not necessarily mean a modification in the strategic plans designed in the previous administration. Rather, and this should be a concerning issue, they reveal the new government’s absence of a strategy. This threatens the state’s governability as well as it allows us to state that this could end in a major crisis for the current administration. Will Michoacán, Guerrero and Oaxaca (and any other state that might face the same issues) prove to be the Achilles’ heel in the current administration’s rhetoric about a peaceful and prosperous Mexico?
CIDAC
Comments