During the last couple of weeks, the National Electoral Institute (INE) has carried out a process of verifying the number of members associated to nationwide political parties. According to the INE’s preliminary data as of June 2014, PAN only possessed 222, 928 members; however, it is worth mentioning that the latter’s National Registry claimed to have 360, 491 members. Although INE’s verified number indicates that it is 3,300 members higher than the amount required by the recently approved General Law of Political Parties (articles 10 and 94) in order to maintain its registry, PAN’s main threat comes from other issue. A party’s membership is one of many elements to assess its strength. Taking that into account, what are the true challenges for PAN in the foreseeable future?
A more or less accurate indicator of a political party’s strength is its electoral performances. In that sense, recent elections held in Coahuila and Nayarit, both traditionally lacking a substantial number of PAN voters, turn out to be quite illustrative. Although PAN does not possess a large amount of members in former state – according to official figures, it would only reach 5,676 individuals, lower than the average of all states – the party has been slowly gaining political positions in recent elections. This boost can be largely explained due to the disappointment of Coahuila voters with the abuses committed by the state’s former Governor, Humberto Moreira. However, in 2014, PAN had to face the letdown of being thrashed in the polls when the state’s Congress was renewed. One of the hypotheses that explain this disaster is the classic argument that an election with a low turnout usually favors PRI, given the latter’s capacity to mobilize voters. Even if this were true, the fact that PAN has lost some of the boost derived from the Moreira outrage should not be overlooked. When the aforementioned political scandal ended its course, PAN had no platform whatsoever. A similar thing is about to happen at a nationwide level. Without a clear opposition project, without convincing explanations regarding its alliance with the federal government via the Pact for Mexico and without capitalizing its scarce advantages – such as its resistance to the 2013 Fiscal Package as well as the VAT homologation in cities that share a border with the U.S., particularly some districts in Coahuila – PAN has entered into a search for new martyrs, something that does not automatically translate into new votes.
The case of Nayarit, even when PAN not only does not possess a solid number of members – it is the country’s third lowest – but also taking into account that the local party’s committee has shown itself as a chaotic institution, where internal struggles and the lack of care from the party’s national authorities, PAN managed to win the election for the capital city, Tepic ahead of PRI. It is also true that this was done by allying itself with PRD given that the latter did not have a candidate for the election, thereby transforming the whole process into a sort of referendum against the outgoing local government and perhaps against the Governor himself. On the other hand, PRD could not translate this de facto alliance into a victory at municipal level. It was close to do so in a few local populations but in those opportunities, the tactic of the anti-PRI referendum was not as useful.
In sum, perhaps PAN is right into not worrying too much about the numbers of its membership. However, the party would be risking a lot if it continues to favor strategies that are more akin to a paltry opposition: one, to rely on federal government’s mistakes and proclaims martyrs derived from the latter; the other one, to trust that a 2015 referendum on, for instance, President Peña’s performance will be the solution to weaken PRI (and not strengthen PAN). If the former party in power does not reconstruct itself from its basis, doctrine, as well as its economic and political project, it will simply be gathering crumbs left by PRI’s tenure.
PAN’s dilemma is self-evident: its performance at the federal stage was pathetic and that is the main explanation for the 2012 electoral cataclysm. During its time in the federal government, PAN could not distinguish itself from PRI regarding corruption; however, it was popularly perceived as incapable to rule. None of those impressions have changed. Nevertheless, its historical strength has resided at the local level: several states where the party has a strong basis. Taking that into account, PAN’s challenges are quite clear: first, consolidating its historical, something for which the party will have several opportunities to do so next year. On the other hand, if it aspires to become the ruling federal party once more, it would have to convince voters that it can govern and that its proposal is different from PRI and PRD and, even more complex, why this proposal is viable after the experience of twelve years after 2000 as well as the Pact’s result. The challenge is immense.
CIDAC
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