Authorities have confirmed the death of the alleged Templario leader, Nazario Moreno, aka “El Chayo”, who was killed in a raid. A scandal promptly ensued: his death had already been reported by the past administration in 2010. The body never appeared and the proof of his death was never clear. This eventuality has succeeded in allowing Enrique Peña Nieto’s government to label the former party in office, PAN, as an inefficient entity. Nevertheless, it seems that the effect of killing drug lords does not stop either the trafficking or the cash flow. The question now is whether this dramatic impact implemented by the government is enough. The security strategy does not seem effective when decreasing crimes and does not show any real progress. What are its implications?
Although the aforementioned exhibited that those operations undertaken by the previous administration didn’t use a proper intelligence work – one just needs to think about the fact that a whole strategy was based in the alleged “first death” of “El Chayo” – that hardly means that PRI currently has a defined (or new) security strategy. It is equally debatable that, despite the apprehension of one of the most wanted criminals in the country (“Chapo” Guzmán), organized crime is continuing with its operations, even in politically key areas for the federal government as the State of Mexico, criminal rates are going up.
It seems that the government is trying to enhance what PAN did in such a flawed manner, but this does not represent an achievement. Killing “El Chayo” or apprehending “El Chapo” is not the same as dismantling a drug trafficking network. The ideal scenario would have the government implementing a follow the money type of strategy in order to detect how large amounts of money are being laundered, where they come from as well as where and under who does the route end. Although it is evident that the federal government has been able to reach agreements that have resulted in the issuing of structural reforms that were previously blocked, it appears to be that most of this efficiency is media-related. For instance, Michoacán, a state where the government thoroughly appointed a special commissioner that would negotiate with vigilante groups. But, will this focused strategy truly end violence? How much is this plan based in questionable agreements?
Mexico is on the verge of a strategy in which the federal government is using previous administration’s mistakes as a way to gain political control; nevertheless, style and substance for achieving this purpose are quite different from the past. The current government modus operandi is based on the centralization of powers and institutions and the number of opposed stakeholders have gradually faded out. PRI’s new way of operating seems to exhibit and amplify past mistakes – without fully correcting them – with the goal of blackmailing its rivals, provide a misleading hail of its current actions based more on smearing PAN’s administrations rather than efficiency, as well as trying to hide the lack of a government program. One should only remember cases such as Oceanografía, the company responsible for providing services to PEMEX, and which thrived thanks to multi-million dollar contracts agreed during PAN’s time in office. The latter is a scandal in which members of the aforementioned party and which are akin to former President Calderón are involved. The strategy consists of putting a “sword of Damocles” over opposition parties, but only after making important progress with the Pact for Mexico. There will certainly be more “dirty laundry” that the government will want to use for its own benefit.
CIDAC
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