On January 28th, in an act held in the official headquarters of the Secretariat of Interior (SEGOB) and without the presence of President Peña, the federal government presented its National Anti-kidnapping Strategy. Among its established guidelines, the creation of an organization that is decentralized from SEGOB, with legally binding faculties at federal and local levels that has the purpose of preventing, sanctioning and tackling the aforementioned the crime. However, what difference will there be between this effort and previous policies that have tried to eradicate kidnapping?
The situation is distressing. According to figures provided by the National Public Security System (SNSP), between 2007 and 2013, the kidnappings that were reported increased by 221 percent, ranging from 2.8 to 9 per every 100 thousand inhabitants. On the other hand, by the end of 2013, the National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI) estimated the occurrence of over 100 thousand kidnappings, which would imply that there would be a non-reported rate (also known as the dark figure of crime) well over 95 per cent.
The National Anti-kidnapping Strategy, led by Renato Sales, aims a series of targets, such as the coordination among dependencies, strengthening the operational capacities of anti-kidnapping units in the 10 states with the highest incidence of the aforementioned crime, homogenizing the judicial framework in the states as well as the protocols in the Public Prosecutor’s Offices, among others. The strategy ought to understand objectively the concept of kidnapping. Although it has lately been linked with drug trafficking, kidnapping has an independent modus operandi and in the worst case scenario, it becomes a business that is parallel to that of drugs. Another essential factor, both in the incidence as well as the non-reported rate and, thus, in the high impunity index of kidnapping, is the collusion of authorities, may they be police officers, investigators, Public Prosecutor’s Offices, and even penitentiary authorities (one only has to remember the kidnapping and extortion operations happening inside prisons). Lastly, kidnapping is a crime whose costs are relatively low for those that engage in them but have a high economic dividend in return. That way, given the complexity and size of the problem, the task for the so-called “anti-kidnapping tsar” is of herculean proportions, not only for preventing and tackling the crime but also for building a solid institutional framework as to identify and punish the corruption of public officers. The temptation of only attacking the incidence without an integral policy that fights crime would mean repeating previous strategies that end up temporarily burying the high-impact crimes, which ultimately resurface when they cease to be in the media spotlight.
On the other hand, the civic society organizations and some key stakeholders that will directly monitor the evolution of the Strategy should be especially careful with this duty. It will be very important to put attention regarding the two stages of vigilance on the transparency and accountability: firstly (something that is sort of like a transparency phase 1.0), the results of the strategy and the defense of guarantees; secondly (transparency 2.0), the assessment of the evaluated policies. At the same time, the organized civic society should be cautious and increase the pressure that, under the desperation of seeking for justice, will end up hurting the aforementioned process and, just like it has happened in the past, violations to human rights might ensue, like allowing a space for exercising impunity (or the doubt regarding the process, just like it happened with the Florence Cassez case).
Tackling kidnappings implies an institutional redesign, not the sporadic capture of “important” criminal groups and dismantling safe houses. As opposed with the actions undertaken by the federal government in Michoacán, the anti-kidnapping policy at least gives the impression to be a real strategy. In the end, the key issue is recovering the confidence of the general population on their authorities.
CIDAC
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