One of the most surprising events in the intense reform period experienced by the country in President Peña’s first year in office has been the negotiation letter issued by PAN in the aforementioned context. Just as PRD had larger resources for entities where it rules and the inclusion of issues within their agenda such as universal pension and unemployment insurance as part of the fiscal miscellaneous resolution, PAN opted for “conditioning” its support to the energy reform with legislative re-election: an inopportune political-electoral reform that offers more complications than solutions and which possess a “historical conquest” whose results are envisaged to be ambiguous, to say the least. The consequences of this decision made by the party leadership, taken within the context of the Pact for Mexico, has disturbed the scenario for political-legislative agreements a lot more than it was originally foreseen. Rather than closing the “circus” (the Latin word for “circle”) of settlements, the political electoral reform has ended up as a circus (using the English meaning) that exhibits the sloppy proceedings of Mexican politics.
Generally, there are at least two perspectives from which the reform can be analyzed: its content and its negotiation process. Regarding the former, just as Senator Layda Sansores stated, opposition was satisfied with a minimal part of what it originally sought, particularly PAN. Referendum, removal from office, second round in Presidential elections and, above all, the intention of decoupling the local electoral bodies of governors, not only ended up as mere wishes but there was little to nothing of what legislators did to support the aforementioned initiatives. PAN members have been satisfied and even proud of gaining the consecutive federal legislative re-election (up to two terms for Senators and four for Deputies), in addition to extending it to local Congresses and municipalities. Regardless of questioning the obstacles – barely toned down in the final draft – put on legislators for seeking to uphold their posts with a different party than the one which nominated them as candidates, reelection is a “double-edged sword” in a Presidential system such as the Mexican one.
It is true: reelection might prove to be a mechanism for accountability, using votes in favor or against the aforementioned concept, with the purpose of assessing the administration of Congressmen and local leaders. However, the lock on party membership has the potential of leaving the decision of nominating a public officer in the hands of those very same parties’ leaderships. Likewise, the reform does not say anything regarding pluri-nominal (proportional) legislators, that is to say, parties will have the possibility of putting their elites – if not, their “favorites” – for a longer period within legislative chambers. In a nutshell, the new reelection scheme sets a mixed system from the one that prevailed since 1933: parties may choose between continuing restricting reelection with the purpose of rotating political factions or, on the other hand, using the aforementioned power to extend the dominant groups’ political life.
Regarding the analysis of the reform’s negotiation process, evidence on the role that the opposition has performed as counterweight to the federal government leads to disappointment. Even worse yet, it has exhibited the low targets of parties that once pretended to be the bearers of democracy and approaching politics with the general populations. Legislators that radically change their ideology in a matter of hours – perhaps influenced by the demanding task of discussing initiatives late at night -, great efficiency in rushing procedures – the reform will not even pass through commissions in the reviewing chambers which, even though it is legal, is not ideal – , “fast-track” changes in drafts and even mistakes in the technical parts of the legislation, are trademarks of a reform that, even changing the number of articles that are equivalent to a fourth part of the Constitution, does not have its positive effects set out clearly at all (except for the politicians involved).
Lastly, after the approval of all reforms issued from the Executive Power, the time will come for President Peña to decide whether the rest of its administration will be a “circus” (using the Latin meaning) that will be part of an inclusive government plan, or just a new version of the circus (using the English meaning) of Mexican politics.
CIDAC
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