The election period is over and media will start publishing some polls regarding President Peña’s approval rating. Despite the talk of a decrease in popularity, it is worth asking: should the government care about polls, particularly with important decisions regarding future reforms on the way?
Through the last administrations, when it comes to assuming risk and public responsibilities, Presidential evaluation surveys seem to have created an unwanted impact on past Mexican Heads of State. For instance, Vicente Fox, on his early months in office, just proposing a fiscal reform – or in simple terms, a general tax increase – started to take a toll on his popularity. Moreover, by mid 2001, according to a Reforma survey, 53% of those who voted for Fox claimed that they wouldn’t have done it if they had known he would raise taxes. Of course, the reform never came to life, not only for the former President’s lack of ability to agree this and other initiatives but for the seeming terror to lose the so-called “democratic bonus”, a result of his 2000 triumph. From that moment on, Fox ended up in a quasi-catatonic lethargy, and slowly started losing the alternation’s political capital, not so much for what he did, but for the clumsiness of what he didn’t do.
On the other hand, Felipe Calderón also cared a lot about surveys, though he did it with a different approach. Instead of letting himself to be gobbled by polling houses, the last administration decided to play the same game and started disseminating surveys made by the Office of the Presidency. In broad terms, Calderón’s approval ratings were kept acceptable during his tenure, even taking drug violence into account, a trait of his administration. As a matter of fact, in 2011, the Chilean organization Latinbarómetro ranked him 7th out of 18 evaluated Presidents, with a 59% approval rating. However, unlike Fox, Calderón’s “good grades” didn’t manage to get PAN a third term in office. The latter was an example of how a “good” Presidential evaluation in polls does not guarantee ulterior success to his colleagues – who are usually identified with continuity, whether they actually enforce it or not. Besides, these ratings weren’t useful on taking Calderón’s agenda forward either.
President Peña has been different from his two predecessors on a single fact: his stand, at least for the moment, has been to satisfy the so-called “comment-ocracy” more than broad population. Unlike Fox, who wanted to satisfy the general public and created animosity with commentators and opinion leaders, President Peña holds a higher approval amongst pundits and writers than the average Mexican. This has allowed him a less hostile media environment that, in addition to his ability in political operations, has resulted in real legislative results.
The current Mexican Head of State now faces two of the traditionally most unpopular reforms: energy and taxing. The former has been a historical taboo and the latter directly affects Mexican taxpayers’ pockets. In that way, not only are protests, raging speeches in Congress and flamboyant pleas of analysts to be expected, but also a decrease in the President’s popularity when his initiative’s terms come to light. However, perhaps the worst factor to consider when elaborating public policies is a survey. Even though opposition may use negative polls in its favor, this shouldn’t transform into a government’s self-imposed censorship or a withdrawal of initiatives that have allegedly passed through enough weighting in order to reflect upon the convenience of forging them ahead. The size of a statesman is not always measured by polls: its true evaluation is with history.
CIDAC
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