It’s been several weeks now since former Tabasco Governor, Andrés Granier Melo, has been mocked by the media and social networks after accusations made by Arturo Núñez, the current Governor, regarding the embezzlement of state resources which allegedly took place during the former administration. Regardless whether Granier is proven guilty or not, and if it the investigation is conducive and hence, he is prosecuted, what other edges will these and other cases (for example, the former Aguascalientes Governor, Luis Armando Reynoso, who’s been accused of misuse of public resources) prove to have, not so much from the perspective of appropriate and swift law enforcement but from the analysis of a “new” relation between state and federal governments?
Even the attention is currently focused on Granier and Reynoso, there is a colorful patchwork of former governors and councilors that are either fugitive – like Tomás Yarrington, former Governor of Tamaulipas – or, even with mounting evidence against them, walk the streets unpunished and even hold public office. The selective use of law enforcement, that is to say, “not tarring with the same brush” similar or worse cases than, for instance, Elba Esther Gordillo’s, seems to come back as a political weapon in the style which was commonly applied a few decades ago. The scheme introduced during the authoritarian regime in which governors showed – with a few ignominious exceptions – high levels of submission to the President started to weaken during the administration of Ernesto Zedillo. Nevertheless, this was taken to an extreme in the PAN Presidential terms, in which liberties of federalism were confused with a quasi-libertine regime of state authorities. An analogy can be drawn from this, in which the Federation came from being an authoritarian and repressive father to a lax one whose children don’t listen to him and even take advantage from the lack of attention, yet still come to him whenever they’re outweighed by their own issues. That way, during the government of Felipe Calderón, states fully extended their hands in order to revel in the sweetness of public debt and the opacity of expenditure but ran towards the President whenever they needed federal forces to intervene in security matters. Likewise, abuse of power kept going on and the federal government did nothing about it.
President Peña’s government appears to have engaged in a “sword of Damocles” strategy, in which current and past Governors, councilors, union leaders, opposition politicians and even factual powers are quite concerned. Power abuses now have the believable threat of being prosecuted. What does it depend on? One should wait to see what comes next for Humberto Moreira (former Coahuila Governor) or Carlos Romero Deschamps (current leader of the oil worker’s union). As for now, state leaders should not only behave well, but given the “federalist” allocation of resources (whose “key”, kept by the Treasury Secretariat, has barely let a few crumbles for others) will have to “earn merit” in order to access the required budgetary participation that is needed to develop their government programs.
In short, if Granier is apprehended, just like it happened with Elba Esther Gordillo, several individuals will try to find a way to not be next on the list; on the other hand, Núñez, who would have eliminated one of his political adversaries, would now owe a “pending debt” to the federal government. No loose strings.
From a broader perspective, beyond the familiar cases or those that are mentioned in the media, the use of Presidential power to discipline Governors or factual powers is experiencing a qualitative change. First and foremost, President Peña has constructed a legal framework that allows him to act without breaking the law, as illustrated, for instance by the amparo law modification. This is a clear difference from the past. On the other hand, not all Governors or factual powers that are allegedly abusive are potentially victims of legal procedure: some have built an admirable legal protection that provides them with virtual immunity to a federal court. All of this gives us two conclusions: on one hand, the attempts of prosecuting people that are allegedly corrupt might be profitable in the face of media attention but not every case concludes well for he who follows. The Oaxaca case is quite an example. On the other hand, the federal government’s actions allow us to observe that its decision of starting judiciary procedures with undisputable legal basis is subject to considerations that are commonly more political than legal.
CIDAC
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