On January 27th, the federal government took a controversial step in response to the conflict between different communities within the state of Michoacán. In a ceremony held in the Tepalcatepec municipality, and headed by the special commissioner for the entity, Alfredo Castillo, a regularization scheme for the self-defense groups was announced; it consists in incorporating them to the Army – as Rural Defense Forces (CDP) -, or to the municipal police forces. The CDP is something to be particularly aware of, since they have been regulated since 1964 in the Organic Law for the Army and the Air Force (LOEFA). The agreement signed between the federal authorities and some self-defense groups enables these vigilante organizations – that are sometimes equipped with weaponry that belongs exclusively to the army and hasn’t had its origin fully explained – to be considered within the army structure, with full rights and obligations, including military jurisdiction. Regardless of the results that this measure might incur, analyzing the signs derived from it seems like the next logical step.
The State’s decision to regulate and incorporate the self-defense groups, however legitimate their reasons to rise up in arms may be, is a de facto acknowledgement of the failure that federal and local authorities have exhibited over the state of rule on the Michoacán region of Tierra Caliente. Nevertheless, beyond all opinions that vigilante groups might provoke, the truth is that they possess a solid social basis – just like the criminal group known as the Templar Knights – which makes more complex applying the law and creates the dangerous temptation of a force that can easily get out of hand. In that way, the Federal Executive Power has made a pragmatic decision that, in the short-term, will prevent high political costs and, very likely, human losses that would have forced the self-defense groups to give up their weapons under the argument of the exclusive use of force via the State.
This amnesty made for self-defense groups is justified by the supposition of them not engaging into drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and/or smuggling – that is to say, activities undertaken by the Templars organization – , is in fact a discretional distinction between “friendly” militia that is willing to cooperate with the State and the rest of armed organizations. The question is whether the authorities may be capable of containing their new “allies” once the “enemy” has been defeated. Making an agreement indistinctively with self-defense groups is a risky affair. For instance, the questions regarding these groups’ legitimacy were not answered, specifically the ones dealing their sources of financing as well as the origin of their weapons. Does the authority have enough certainty that all regulated self-defense groups have no links with organized crime? On the other hand, once the criminal structure of the Templar Knights has been dismantled. What will happen with the other groups that are roaming around the Michoacán territory such as Jalisco Nueva Generación, the Zetas or the Sinaloa cartels?
Lastly, a stakeholder that has practically been uninvolved with the exceptional Michoacán situation has been the opposition. Although PAN Senators have stated that they will hold their plenary meeting in Morelia and that, although they will make a tour on the conflict zone, the opposition has not made any critical statements with the appointment of the commissioner (whose legal basis is not clear by any means) and even less over the Tepalcatepec Pact. Perhaps over fear of being judged as their previous actions in the federal government – in the case of PAN – and in the local administration – in the case of PRD – or for mere negligence or stalling, the opposition has provided a “blank check” for the federal government on its policies aimed for Michoacán.
Summarizing, without taking into account whether justice is taken by their “own hands” or if it is momentarily kept “under control”, the Peña administration has taken a decision. However, will he follow the same path with states that have similar problems such as Guerrero? The Pandora box is wide open. However, the main issue at stake is not a moral one: it is not a decision that will legitimize a specific political actor, but something that will restore order and calmness to the country. The main question is if whether this path will make a difference at all or will it just be a way to pacify the conflict rapidly.
CIDAC
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