It has been over a week since Joaquín Guzmán, AKA “El Chapo”, was apprehended and there are still many questions regarding the scope of its imprisonment, ranging from the possible consequences in a readjustment occurring within the organized crime, to his possible extradition to the United States. What appears clear is that his arrest seems to have been more of an isolated result from the direct intervention of the American research department rather than the product of the implementation of an integral strategy developed by the Mexican government. This is why it is not strange that the first confirmation of his apprehension came from the U.S., both from its media as well as its official institutions (the DEA removed Guzmán from its “Most Wanted” website way before the official announcement of the Mexican government).
As part of the accumulation of government actions for more than year after the beginning of the current federal administration, it is not an adventurous task to notice a pattern. In that sense, the apprehension of “El Chapo” reinforces the idea that Mexico only has a selective type of justice, whose purpose consists more in sending intimidating messages that contributing in consolidating a true rule of law. As it happened with union leader Elba Esther Gordillo, whose apprehension sent a message to the political class regarding the lack of “untouchables”, the arrest of Guzmán – the richest drug lord in the world – sends a similar statement to all criminal organizations: if he can fall, then everyone else can. Likewise, the federal government, via the Attorney General’s Office, has threatened to investigate public officers of previous administrations and even businessmen. The selective justice does not distinguish between interest groups.
Executing selective justice under the premise that there are no “untouchables” in Mexico can end up allying not only political actors but also other stakeholders, such as the organized civic society and the media that, during PAN governments, had an increasingly defying stance directed towards authorities. What is even worse, consolidating a regime that functions from the basis of a logic defined by either loyalty or repression has become the norm due to the absence of opposition in the party system, which is currently characterized by PAN’s structural weakness as well as a fragmentation within the left-wing faction. The tendency begins to build the sensation of an authoritarian government that is capable of aligning several interests in its favor which is worth asking: what purpose does the control serve? That is the key issue at stake.
While we may agree that, unlike previous administrations, the current government can be identified by having a greater capacity in exercising power, it should be said that the latter is not a value on itself. Although this behavior strengthens the position of this administration through generating loyalties, it does not contribute anything in consolidating a true and lasting rule of law. It cannot be stated that we’re in the verge of a reemergence of the old regime, but it can be said that we’re witnessing the birth of a new institutional agreement that is different from the one that occurred in the so-called years of transition. The risk is that, once political operators have changed, the existing agreements may crumble. It would hardly be the first time something similar has happened in Mexico. Lastly, the debate of what sort of government do Mexicans want is happening; the problem is that until now, reality seems to force us to choose between a misleading link between control and efficiency on one hand and democracy and paralysis on the other.
CIDAC
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