Michoacán has got a fundamental problem: the lack of a clear strategy from both local and federal levels of government despite the growing violence and institutional breakdown. What is even worse, there doesn’t seem to be a defined diagnosis or a strategy to address the causes of the phenomenon that has been occurring in the area. In principle, the objective behind the strategy is the takeover and pacification of particular areas within the state, particularly Tierra Caliente. Nevertheless, the presence and evolution of vigilante groups, the emergence of organized crime groups as well as the “social laws” of such organizations within specific areas – including curfews, barter, among others – tell of a problem that deserves a higher purpose: what Michoacán needs is social justice. Judging by the appointment of a Federal Commissioner, all indicates that the government is assuming that the essence of the problem is a lack of public structure.
Michoacán’s violence phenomenon is very complex and is similar to the one observed in other states such as Chihuahua: the levels of violence have been way above the national average and the social fabric has started to tear apart. In fact, it is that very decomposition what ensured a fertile ground for the emergence of vigilante groups. These organizations have gained a degree of legitimacy among some sectors of society, which show the failure of state and municipal authorities when trying to ensure public order. The federal government has decided to disarm and prosecute these groups. Whether this action is justifiable or not, given the fact that several voices claim that these vigilante groups have pacified complete municipalities within the state, the truth is that the Michoacán problem is not attributable to their existence, so it should not be the main objective in the new police strategy implemented by the Governor as well as the federal government.
Social justice in Michoacán implies a strategy using different angles. Indeed, police intervention is necessary but military engagement can be questioned. Nevertheless, it is an insufficient strategy given that, although it has been present since the intervention ordered by Felipe Calderón in 2006, it has not ensured the reconstruction of the social fabric. Cleaning up state and municipal authorities is essential by sending public officers that are complicit with criminal organizations; the acknowledgment of irreconcilable crime groups; considering that vigilante groups gained important legitimacy in some municipalities, so the option of disarming them and presenting federal lawsuits will not be enough. As a matter of fact, it is worth asking whether it will be necessary to provide some kind of amnesty for these groups, granting a federal pardon for illegal possession of weapons and other misdemeanors, analyzing where these weapons come from as well as transforming members of these groups into citizen watchers aimed at monitoring areas and promoting policies of crime prevention.
This is a special case of creating and building institutions, as opposed at to what the country is used to. A short-sighted solution would be to call for elections in order to reconfigure who will be in charge of public charges. With the engagement in budgetary issues of the organized crime, an election might even result as a counterproductive issue.
If the latter is not set in motion, the state can be “pacified” in the short term, but could become into a land of grudges in coming years. The latter means going back to post-Revolutionary social conditions where conflicts were solved face to face rather than institutionally. This would result in a substantial increase of first-degree murders, especially within rural and urban areas of Tierra Caliente. When we realize that justice creates trust, and trust leads to legitimacy, we will be able to start rebuilding Michoacán institutions. As of now, the President has sent his main collaborator to face the issue, which suggests the level of priority that the problem has obtained.
CIDAC
Comments