PAN has joined PRD in delaying forums about the energy reform to be held at the Senate, which has conditioned them to prioritize the debate regarding the different initiatives of political/electoral reforms presented by the opposition. The PAN request of turning the political reform ’s approval as a “bargaining chip” in order to advance on energy issues is not recent by any means. However, how convenient is the current strategy nowadays?
Regardless of the consequent crisis originated from losing the Presidency, PAN leadership has been gaining some battles in its internal struggles by using strategies that go from statuary reform to taking control of both legislative party whips. The latter has been highlighted by the proposal of a political/electoral reform presented in the Senate on September 24. It includes modifying 28 Constitutional articles, with innovations such as the creation of a National Electoral Institute – centralizing the corresponding functions and thereby disappearing local electoral entities -, the reelection of legislators and municipal authorities, as well as the Constitutional amendment of the so-called “deliberative democracy”. Nevertheless, one of the less discussed issues in public opinion is the one dealing with modifications of rules regarding the allocation of financial resources for political parties, described in the A section of the 41st Constitutional article.
In the face of the reform proposed by PAN, the party seems to be willing to sacrifice the electoral system’s battered federalism – which, certainly, remains overwhelmed mostly by local governments – in exchange of a guarantee of minimum provision of public resources using formulas elevated to Constitutional range. In its goal of “leveling the budgetary playing field”, acknowledging the importance of money in political operations above the programmatic or ideological stance, PAN members could be making two mistakes. One, conditioning a reform which could even benefit them, such as the energy one and that they would be still willing to approve, in exchange of something that they consider to be essential to aspire to regaining power: taxpayers’ money. Two, leaving aside other points in their agenda that could be more attractive for their clientele, both the survivors of debacle as potential ones (tax issues, consolidation of federalized government mechanisms, strengthening of municipalities’ powers, greater counterweights for the Executive power, more efficient rules for reallocation of federal contributions, a real independence from regulatory agencies, among others). This way, PAN members intend, firstly, to be secured in the issue of resources and, afterwards, see if they can boost their agenda, which is why its tendency to back up centralizing tools doesn’t cease to be both peculiar and contradictory, since they were completely opposed to it in the years of PRI rule.
Summarizing, PAN has its objectives quite clear, even though it is not fighting the battles necessary for them to boost them. Access to resources is essential. That is true. However, it should be important taking into account that the current political scenario will be unrepeatable, especially when other issues, such as negative publicity, were lost in the past electoral reform and without them, its return to power remains an utopia. Peña’s administration only requires PAN members to advance its Constitutional reforms. The rest of its agenda can pass with the current legislative majorities of PRI, PVEM (Green Party) and PANAL (New Alliance Party), at least from here to 2015. Thereby, it will be fundamental that PAN can set up a strategy, beyond the budgetary issue, with the aim of generating competitive conditions and, especially, reconstructing its identity. If it doesn’t manage to do that, PAN could be destined into remaining within a goblet of smear in which all political parties are summoned into.
CIDAC
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